The Software Piracy Battle in Latin America: Should the United States Pursue Its Aggressive Bilateral Trade Policy Despite the Multilateral Trips Enforcement Framework by Knapp, Inti Linkletter
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1. INTRODUCTION
Software piracy may be defined as the illegal copying or unau-
thorized use of a software product.' In Latin America,2 packaged
software3 accounted for $3.54 billion in sales and $1.24 billion in
tax revenues in 1998. 4 Latin America is the third fastest growing
market for packaged software.' In 1996, however, Latin Ameri-
can software piracy resulted in a loss of $980,600,000 to interna-
tional software manufacturers.6  In 1997, the loss was
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ment to my Ecuadorian mother, software engineer father, and devoted hus-
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JIEL editors, especially Eric Green and Ellen Reimer, who provided invaluable
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I See BERNARD A. GALLER, SOFTWARE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION: COPYRIGHT AND PATENT ISSUES FOR COMPUTER AND LEGAL
PROFESSIONALS 67 (1995).
2 "Latin America" refers to the following nineteen countries: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto
Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
TO THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES 46 (1999) (study commissioned by the
Business Software Alliance).
Packaged software, such as "Microsoft Office," is distributed through a
variety of channels rather than being custom programmed for an individual
purchaser. See id. at 6, 18.
4 See id. at 1.
s See Scott Studebaker, Microsoft's Challenges in Latin America, LATIN Am.
L. & BUS. REP., July 31, 1995, at 3 (interviewing Jeffrey Steinhardt, Microsoft's
corporate attorney for Latin America).
6 INT'L PLANNING AND RESEARCH CORP. FOR THE BUS. SOFTWARE
ALLIANCE AND SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS'N, 1998 GLOBAL SOFTWARE
PIRACY REPORT 7 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY
REPORT]. These piracy figures calculate lost sales rather than pirated copies as
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$978,000,000. 7 In 1998, the loss increased to $1,045,500,000.8 The
U.S. software industry has vigorously combated Latin American
software piracy by way of internal litigation, lobbying of legisla-
tures, education, and cooperation with domestic law enforcement
agencies.9
The U.S. government, in part because of complaints from the
software industry, has applied unilateral pressure on Latin Ameri-
can countries to increase their copyright protection through legis-
lation. Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act
of 1988 requires the United States Trade Representative
("USTR") to review annually the intellectual property practices
of U.S. trading partners and sanction countries engaged in trade
practices deemed unfair to U.S. interests."0 Section 301 trade
threats against certain Latin American nations have resulted in
changes in their domestic intellectual property laws." The soft-
ware industry's pressure to pursue section 301 actions against in-
fringing countries is unlikely to vanish, given the success of the
USTR's actions in strengthening software copyright protection."
In 1994, the United States and the Latin American nations
signed the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPs"), an annex to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") that established the World Trade
Organization ("WTO")."3 The GATT resulted from post-World
War II efforts to develop a system of free trade among nations,
a proportion of total sales. See id. at 11-12. Often these piracy figures are over-
estimates, because many buyers of pirated software would never have pur-
chased software at full price. See The Property of the Mind, ECONOMIST, July
27, 1996, at 57.
7 See 1998 GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
' See id. (citing the most recent figures available).
9 See generally Studebaker, supra note 5, at 3, 31-32 (recounting various ef-
forts undertaken to combat software piracy).
'o See 19 U.S.C. % 2411-2420 (1999).
" For example, Argentina has finally extended copyright protection to
computer software. See infra Section 2.3 (discussing recent changes in Latin
American domestic copyright laws) and infra Section 2.3.1 (discussing 1998
Argentine changes in copyright law).
12 See SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 223 (1998).
13 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafterTRIPs Agreement].
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and resulted in a successful forum in which to negotiate trade
agreements and disputes." Having operated under secretariats
since 1948, the GATT was replaced in 1995 with the WTO,
which is "essentially a continuation of the GATT under a new
name.""5 Therefore, under TRIPs, the WTO may assemble inter-
national panels to consider intellectual property trade disputes. 6
Article 10.1 of the TRIPs Agreement provides that members
must comply with the Berne Convention' by providing protec-
tion under copyright law to computer software. 8 The TRIPs
Agreement incorporates the Berne Convention, which has served
as this century's predominant international intellectual property
treaty.
One of the principal motives for including intellectual prop-
erty rights as part of the Uruguay Round of the GATT was the
perception that the existing international intellectual property re-
gime lacked effective enforcement.19 Accordingly, Part III of the
TRIPS Agreement establishes a comprehensive enforcement re-
gime.2"
Although the United States has successfully forced certain
Latin American nations to change their copyright laws, some
commentators argue that these changes exist on paper only.2
True protection of software intellectual property will not exist
until Latin American nations enforce their newly revised copy-
right laws.
Section 2 of this comment provides an overview of the intel-
lectual property legal structure relevant to software copyright is-
sues in Latin America, including: a discussion of domestic laws,
14 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT AND THE GATT: AN
INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS ACT 1 (1995).
15 Id.
16 See id. at 2.
I" Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 102 Stat. 2853, 828
U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
18 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 9.1, 10.1.
19 See MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPs AGREEMENT 123
(1996).
20 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13.
21 See SELL, supra note 12, at 177.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j. Int'l Econ. L.
international treaties, multilateral agreements, and U.S. trade laws
that authorize the USTR to push for bilateral agreements.
Section 3 discusses underlying reasons for the software piracy
problem in Latin America.
Section 4 argues that the United States should no longer com-
bat software copyright piracy using unilateral trade threats to
force bilateral agreements; instead, the United States should use
the WTO enforcement mechanisms created by TRIPs.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LEGAL STRUCTURE
2.1. Copyright Law Background
Copyright law has historically protected literary expression
such as books and poetry.' In the United States, copyright law
grants software copyright owners exclusive rights to their works
for varying periods, but typically with a ninety-five-year maxi-
mum period.' Copyright is an automatic protection that is con-
ferred as soon as an original expression, e.g., the computer code, is
fixed in a tangible medium.24 Publication or registration is not
required.' Copyright protection is "thin" because it permits du-
plication of function, or underlying ideas, as long as the expres-
sion differs.26 For example, a programmer may develop an idea
such as a word processor, as long as he or she does not directly
copy the computer language or visual expression of another crea-
tor's word processor.
In contrast, U.S. patent law offers twenty years of protection
to owners of inventions, i.e., works that are non-obvious, novel,
and useful.' Unlike copyright law, a patent protects its owner
against all users and sellers of the patented invention, even an in-
dependent discoverer.28
2 See GALLER, supra note 1, at 30.
23 See 17 U.S.C. 5 302 (1999).
24 See STEERING COMM. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN
SOFTWARE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN
SOFTWARE 24 (1991) [hereinafter STEERING COMM.].
21 See id.
26 See id.
27 See 35 U.S.C. S 154 (1999); GALLER, supra note 1, at 30.
28 See id. at 31.
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Industrial designs such as software are generally covered by
both copyright and patent law in all industrialized countries.29 In
the United States, copyright is the preferred intellectual property
protection for software." The pro-copyright argument holds that
patents are anti-competitive because they hinder independent in-
vention and progress of technology through the monopoly
granted to the patent owner.3' With strong U.S. encouragement,
copyright protection has become the international standard for
software. The general consensus of the developed-world is that
computer programs can be protected under classic copyright
terms as works of authorship because the activity involved in
writing a computer program is comparable to the activity of writ-
ing a book or symphony.
2.2. The U.S. Bilateral Approach: Intellectual Property in U.S.
Trade Legislation
The U.S. government worked throughout the 1980s and 1990s
to improve the level of intellectual property protection granted
by Latin American nations. This Section explains the influence
the United States has exerted by way of unilateral trade threats
and bilateral negotiations with Latin American governments.
2.2.1. Origin of Section 301 and Special 301
Section 301 and Special 301 of the United States Trade Act of
1974 have been effective tools in the U.S. battle against intellec-
tual property piracy. In 1984, pressure from trade lobbyists and
an impasse at the GATT over whether to confront intellectual
property issues resulted in an amendment to section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974.33 The original section 301 allowed the Presi-
dent to pursue elimination of "unjustifiable or unreasonable"
trade practices.34 The 1984 Trade and Tariff Act "made intellec-
29 See STEERING COMM., supra note 24, at 21.
30 See id. at 22.
31 See id. at 31.
32 See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 43 (1990).
" See BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at 4.
34 Id.
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tual jroperty protection explicitly actionable under section
301."
The success of section 301 led to the enactment of Special 301
of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.6 Spe-
cial 301 requires the USTR to review annually the intellectual
property practices of U.S. trading partners." The USTR must
identify "priority foreign countries" that deny "adequate and ef-
fective protection of intellectual property rights" or that deny
"fair and equitable market access" to U.S. traders. 8 The USTR
must then assign "priority foreign countries" to a watch list or a
priority watch list, investigate the countries on a six-month fast
track, and then engage in trade retaliation of increased duties or
import restrictions.39
2.2.2. Representative USTR Actions in Latin America
Concerning Computer Software Copyright Protection
The USTR has encouraged various Latin American nations to
pass stronger intellectual property laws than TRIPs requires. For
example, on December 16, 1997, the United States concluded a Bi-
lateral Intellectual Property Rights Agreement with Nicaragua
that required Nicaragua to provide protection to copyrights, pat-
ents, trademarks, trade secrets, semiconductor layout designs, en-
crypted satellite signals, and geographical indications.4  The
agreement contained enforcement provisions to combat in-
fringement of intellectual property rights with both civil remedies
and criminal penalties.4" Furthermore, the agreement required
Nicaragua to implement the protections within eighteen months,
approximately six months prior to the TRIPs deadline.42 U.S.
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky hoped that "[t]his
Agreement [would] provide a model for other Central American
" Id. at 4 (citing 98 Stat. 2948 (1984)).
36 See id. at 4-5 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1990)).
17 See id. at 5.
38 Id.
39 See id.
40 See USTR, U.S. and Nicaragua Reach Bilateral Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement (last modified Dec. 22, 1997) < http://www.ustr.gov/reeases/1997/
12/97-109.pdf> (USTR Press Release).
41 See id.
42 See id.
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countries, and stimulate increased protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights in the region."43
On April 17, 1998, the United States and Bolivia signed a Bi-
lateral Investment Treaty intended to strengthen trade relations
between the two nations.' Bolivia, a relatively impoverished na-
tion, stood to greatly benefit from increased U.S. investment.
Ms. Barshefsky explained that the treaty was made possible by
Bolivia's economic reform, including a commitment to accelerate
its compliance with TRIPs.4'
Such section 301 actions are not expected to cease despite the
enactment of the multilateral TRIPs amendment to the GATT.46
In its legislation adopting TRIPs, the U.S. House of Representa-
tives stated that "nothing in this Act shall be construed... to
limit any authority conferred under a law of the United States,
including section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, unless specifically
provided for in this Act."47 As evidenced in Nicaragua and Bo-
livia, the USTR is still actively engaged in unilateral trade threats
against Latin American countries despite the existence of multi-
lateral WTO dispute mechanisms.
2.3. Domestic Copyright Laws in Latin America
This Section explores the status of copyright protection in
two of Latin America's largest economies: Argentina and Brazil.
These countries' experiences are representative of the majority of
Latin American countries, many of whom recently enacted laws
that grant intellectual property protection to computer software,
but did so only after the U.S. government pressured them with
trade sanction threats.48
43 Id.
44 See USTR, United States and Bolivia Sign Bilateral Investment Treaty (last
modified Apr. 17, 1998) <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1998/04/98-41.pdf>
(USTR Press Release).
4 See id.
46 See SELL, supra note 12, at 222.
4 Sylvia Morrison, How Will the Uruguay Round of GATT Affect the U.S.
Computer Industry?, Congressional Research Report for Congress, Report No.
94-840-E, Nov. 3, 1994, at 3 (citing H.R. 5110).
48 See, e.g., False Friends (Piracy in Mexico), ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996, at 66
(describing how the United States successfully pressured Mexico to strengthen
and enforce intellectual property laws).
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2.3.1. Argentina
Argentina's long-standing copyright law, Number 11.723,
grants copyright to "literary and artistic works."49 The law in-
cludes a list of products afforded copyright protection, such as
books and records."0
The law, of course, does not include computer software, a
technology that was virtually unknown when the law was passed.
During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. software companies, such as
Microsoft and Unisys, exerted pressure upon the Argentine gov-
ernment to amend the law to protect computer software, a $1.8
billion annual business in Argentina.51 In addition, in 1993 the
USTR placed Argentina on the Special 301 Priority Watch List,
meaning that if Argentina did not modify its intellectual property
laws regarding pharmaceutical patents, the United States would
retaliate with unilateral trade sanctions. 2
In accordance with the Berne Convention, a 1994 presidential
decree extended Law Number 11.723 to include copyright protec-
tion for computer software. 3 This decree, however, lacked teeth.
On February 3, 1998, in direct contradiction of the presidential
decree, the Argentine Supreme Court held that copying computer
software without manufacturer authorization was not a crime. 4
The Court's decision protected the Argentine defendant company
Benito Roggio's copying of an engineering design program made
by U.S. plaintiff Autodesk, Inc. on grounds that Law Number
11.723 did not extend copyright protection to computer soft-
ware.
55
19 Beth Rubenstein, Argentina Amends Law to Define Software as Eligible
for Piracy Protection, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 44, at 1891 (Nov. 11,
1998) [hereinafter Rubenstein, Argentina Amends Law].
" See Software Protection Measure Stalls Once Again in Argentine Congress,
15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 16, at 703 (Apr. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Soft-
ware Protection Measure Stalls].
51 See Rubenstein, Argentina Amends Law, supra note 49.
52 See USTR, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SECTION 301 DEVELOPMENTS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 309(A)(3) OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, at 27 (June
1996-Jan. 1998) [hereinafter 1998 USTRREPORT TO CONGRESS].
" See Argentina: Economic Trends, July 1998: An Overview, INT'L
MARKET INSIGHT REP., July 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13711938.
' See Beth Rubenstein, Argentina Tightens Piracy Laws/or Software Indus.
try, J. COM., Nov. 24, 1998 [hereinafterRubenstein, Argentina Tightens Piracy
Laws]; Rubenstein, Argentina Amends Law, supra note 49.
" See En repues.ta a un fallo de la Corte Suprema las empresas informdticas
amenazan con limitar inversiones en el pals, EL CRONISTA (Feb. 4, 1998)
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The U.S. software industry was shocked. An Argentine rep-
resentative stated that the decision was "a step backwards com-
pared to the rest of the world." 6 In response, the U.S. govern-
ment and the software industry pushed for the passage of a
pending amendment to Law Number 11.723 that would explicitly
protect software."7
In October 1998, the Argentine Congress and President Car-
los Menem passed the urged amendment to Law 11.723, adding
software and databases to the list of products protected by copy-
right.5 8 The amendment went into effect in November 1998,
upon publication in the country's official bulletin. 9  The
amended law states that new programs created by employees dur-
ing the course of business could belong to the company, rather
than the individual programmer, if agreed to as a term of em-
ployment.6" In addition, the law specifies that a software program
purchaser may make only one copy for security purposes, to be
used only if the original software fails.61 Jail sentences range from
six months to six years, and the software's creator can sue for
losses and court costs.
62
The amendment passed the Lower House of the Argentine
Congress in September 1997.63 However, the measure stalled in
the Senate over the clause granting companies, rather than the in-
dividual creator, ownership of the software copyright.' Jorge
Cassino, president of the Chamber of Software Companies and
Computer Services, explained that the Senate members viewed
the clause "as a way for companies to 'get rich illegally,' rather
than as a legitimate protection of their investment. Cassino
added, "[The Senators] see this as some kind of manipulation by
<http://www.cronista.com> [hereinafter EL CRONISTA; Rubenstein, Argen-
tina Tightens Piracy Laws, supra note 54.
56 EL CRONISTA, supra note 55.
17 See id.; see also Software Protection Measure Stalls, supra note 50.
58 See Software Protection Measure Stalls, supra note 50.
s See Rubenstein, Argentina Tightens Piracy Laws, supra note 54.
See Software Protection Measure Stalls, supra note 50.
61 See Rubenstein, Argentina Amends Law, supra note 49.
62 See Argentine Software Manufacturers Launch Campaign for Anti-Piracy
Law Compliance, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 47, at 2006 (Dec. 2, 1998).
63 See Software Protection Measure Stalls, supra note 50.
'4 See id.
65 Id.
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Microsoft." Senator Jorge Yoma declared, "'This law isn't
against piracy. It's for taking away copyright protection from
workers.' 67 The bill ultimately passed Congress, but the Senate
had clearly voiced its resentment over the perceived benefits of
the bill to the U.S. software industry.
A Microsoft spokesman declared, "It is about time the gov-
ernment backs us up legally. We've been fighting piracy for too
long without any support."6" A Business Software Alliance attor-
ney said that the law "'removes any question we have, and gives
the full protection we need .... With more enforcement, we ex-
pect that the piracy 'ate in Argentina could drop a lot further."'69
With this law in place, the U.S. software industry has achieved its
lobbying goal.
The USTR described the 1998 law as a "positive step."7"
However, the USTR argues that the Argentine government is still
insufficiently protecting intellectual property rights." In October
1999, Deputy U.S Trade Representative Richard Fisher met with
representatives of Argentine presidential candidate Fernando de la
Rua and urged compliance with TRIPS, under threat of a WTO
action.' De la Rua was elected Argentine president on October
24, 1999, replacing President Menem after a ten-year term, but the
Argentine Congress and Courts remain under control of Me-
nem's political party. 3 As the January 1, 2000 deadline for TRIPs
compliance approached, the USTR announced the initiation of
WTO dispute settlement proceedings against Argentina for in-
adequate pharmaceutical patent protection. 4 It remains to be
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Rubenstein, Argentina Tightens Piracy Laws, supra note 54.
69 Robert MacMillan, Argentine Government Targets Piracy, NEWSBYTES,
Nov. 2, 1998.
70 See USTR, USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review (last
modified Apr. 30, 1999) < http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/O4/99.1.html >
(USTR Press Release).
71 See id.
7 See Corbett B. Daly, U.S. Threatens Argentina with Complaint under
TRIPsAgreement, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 41, at 1712 (Oct. 20, 1999).
' See Clifford Krauss, Argentina's Switch: Electing a Less Flamboyant
Leader, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 26, 1999, at A6.
'z See USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review, supra note 70,
at 4.
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seen how the new Argentine presidential administration will react
to ongoing U.S. trade pressure.
2.3.2. Brazil
Brazil derived its intellectual property system from late nine-
teenth century Europe,75 which offered traditional protection to
literary works. Under the antiquated system, Brazilian intellec-
tual property law did not protect computer software.
Beginning in 1987, the United States pressured Brazil to enact
legislation that would grant copyright protection to computer
software.76 Since both nations were members of the Universal
Copyright Convention' and the Berne Convention, copyright
protection could be extended to software without legal diffi-
culty.
78
In response to U.S. pressure, a Brazilian law went into effect
on December 18, 1987 that granted copyright protection to com-
puter software.79 However, the U.S. government was dissatisfied
because the 1987 Software Law included a "law of similars" for
foreign-manufactured software marketed in Brazil." A "law of
similars" mandates that foreign-manufactured software may not
be allowed into the Brazilian market if there is a functional soft-
ware equivalent manufactured by a Brazilian controlled com-
pany. 1 In addition, the law extended only twenty-five years of
protection to software, rather than the normal fifty years Brazil
granted to other copyrighted works.82
75 See SHERWOOD, supra note 32, at 106.
' See Theodore G. Bryant, Comment, The History, Development and
Changing Environment of Protecting Computer Software Against Copyright Vio-
lation in Brazil, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 375, 389 (1995).
' See id. (citing Universal Copyright Convention of June 19, 1970, 1
B.D.I.E.L. 811).
78 See Bryant, supra note 76, at 389; see also infra Section 2.4 (discussing the
UCC and the Berne Convention).
71 See Software Protection Law, No. 7.646 of Dec. 18, 1987; see also Bry-
ant, supra note 76, at 389 (citing Brazilian Senate Sets 'Top Urgency' Debate on
Software Law in Response to U.S. Action, 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1287 (Oct.
21, 1987).
80 See Bryant, supra note 76, at 389 (citing George Charles Fischer, The
Software Law, LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP., Sept. 1994, at 8).
81 See id. at 389 n.100.
82 See id. at 390.
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In November 1987, the Reagan Administration responded
with trade sanctions, raising tariffs on selected Brazilian exports
to the United States and prohibiting importation of Brazilian
computer products. 3 The controversy over allowing U.S. goods
full market access into Brazil subsided once the Brazilian National
Council for Informatics reversed a previous trade decision exclud-
ing Microsoft MS-DOS 3.2 from the Brazilian market, thus allow-
ing the improved DOS software into the country.84 The United
States lifted the trade sanctions in February 1988, but continued
to investigate Brazil's trade practices until the "Super 301" case
ended in October 1989.85
However, the "law of similars" and the twenty-five year term
of protection remained unchanged. Throughout the 1990s, the
United States continued to pressure Brazil to improve its copy-
right laws. On May 28, 1993, the USTR self-initiated an investi-
gation into whether Brazil was denying adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights, and whether the United
States should implement trade retaliations against Brazil under
section 301.86 On February 28, 1994, the USTR terminated the
investigation because of Brazilian assurances that it would im-
prove its intellectual property laws.87 In April 1995, due to Bra-
zil's lack of legislative progress, the USTR placed Brazil on its
Priority Watch List, which constituted a threat of imminent trade
sanctions if Brazil did not comply with U.S. demands.88 In April
1996, after Brazil passed improved patent protection for pharma-
ceuticals, the USTR moved Brazil from the Priority Watch List
to the Watch List, lessening the threat of trade sanctions. That
same year, the USTR affirmed that "the U.S. Administration
looks to Brazil to fulfill its longstanding commitments to enact
83 See USTR, Section 301 Table of Cases (last modified Aug. 9, 1999)
<http:// www.ustr.gov/reports/301report/act3Ol.htm> [hereinafter Section
301 Table] (discussing the disposition of "Brazil Informatics (301 49)"); see also
Bryant, supra note 76, at 390 (citing Trade Sanctions Imposed Against Brazil,
Statement (Nov. 13, 1987) in DEPT. ST. BULL., Jan. 1988, at 60) (noting that the
trade sanctions were also related to U.S. dissatisfaction with Brazilian sanctions
in the computer products markets).
84 See Bryant, supra note 76, at 391.
85 See Section 301 Table, supra note 83 ("Brazil Informatics (301_49)").
86 See id. ("Brazil Intellectual Property Rights (301_91)").
87 See id.
88 See 1998 USTR REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 52, at 21.
89 See id.
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outstanding legislation on computer software... and to intro-
duce much-needed amendments to its copyright law."9" In the
1997 section 301 review, the USTR kept Brazil on the Watch List,
pending Brazilian legislation on computer software copyright.91
On February 19, 1998, Brazilian President Fernando Enrique
Cardoso signed into law a bill that grants computer software the
same fifty-year term of copyright protection as literary works.92
The legislation establishes prison terms of one to four years for
pirating, sets fines ranging up to 3,000 times the value of software
sold illegally, and permits the federal tax department to prosecute
software pirates for tax evasion.93 Additionally, the law elimi-
nates a requirement that companies register software programs
with the Ministry of Science and Technology." 94 "Software
manufactured by foreign countries is protected... provided that
Brazilian software" receives the same protection in the countries
where the imported software originates. 9'
On September 29, 1998, a Rio de Janeiro court delivered the
first judicial decision under the software law.96 The court found a
Brazilian advertising agency, Artplan Comunicacao, guilty of us-
ing pirated software, including applications by Adobe, Autodesk,
Microsoft, and Symantec. 97 The court ordered Artplan to pay
damages of $65 million, equivalent to 500 times the value of the
illegal software discovered during a police inspection.98
' USTR, "Special 301" on Intellectual Property Rights and 1996 Title VII
Decisions (last modified May 2, 1996) <http:/www.ustr.gov/reports/
301report/factsheets.html > (USTR Fact Sheet).
91 See 1998 USTR REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 52, at 21.
92 See Brazilian President Cardoso Signs Measures Penalizing Copyright Pi-
racy, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 338 (Feb. 25, 1998); see a so Brazil-
ian Senate Passes Bill to Protect Software Copyrights, 15 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) No. 4, at 154 (Jan. 28, 1998) (discussing the terms of the bill which ex-
tends new software protections, including the provision that protects copy-
righted software for 50 years).
"' See Brazilian President Cardoso Signs Measures Penalizing Copyright Pi-
racy, supra note 92.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See Artplan Ordered to Pay US$65m Damages, Bus. TIMES (Malay.), Sept.
29, 1998, at 16.
97 See id.
98 See id.
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After extensive trade pressure from the United States, Brazil
finally granted meaningful copyright protection to computer
software.
2.4. International Treaties
"Worldwide copyright does not exist."" Instead, protection
against infringement depends on the national laws of each particu-
lar country.1  International treaties between countries establish a
minimum level of intellectual property protection that each sig-
natory agrees to implement."' Prior to TRIPs, multilateral trea-
ties were the favored mechanism for internationally negotiating
intellectual property requirements in developed and developing
nations."
2.4.1. Universal Copyright Convention (UCC)
In 1952, the UCC was signed, and was to be administered by
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organi-
sation ("UNESCO"). 3 The basis of the UCC is "national treat-
ment," which requires that all member countries accord foreign
works the same protection granted to domestic works."° Domes-
tic formalities such as registration are excused if all published cop-
ies of a work bear a notice, or if the work is unpublished.0 A
member of the UCC can also impose additional requirements for
works first published within its own territory.0 6 The United
States joined the UCC in 1955, but withdrew from UNSECO in
1984."0 Although it was still a UCC member, the United States
could not influence the UCC very effectively as a nonparticipant
11 MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 372 (2d ed.
1995).
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 See discussion infra Sections 2.4, 2.5.
103 See Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6U.S.T. 2732, 216
U.N.T.S. 133; BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at 26.
104 See LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 373.
105 See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE
NINETIES 10 (1993).
106 See id.
107 See LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 373 & n.7 (citing U.S. Notifies UNESCO
of Intent to Withdraw, 84 U.S. Dept. of State Bull. No. 2083, 41 (1984)).
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in UNSECO. 8 This was a driving factor in the United States'
entry into the Berne Convention in 1989.19 The UCC is still
marginally relevant to international intellectual property because,
as of January 1, 1989, twenty developing countries were still
members of the UCC but not the Berne Convention."'
2.4.2. The Berne Convention
The oldest multilateral copyright convention is the Interna-
tional Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(the Berne Convention), administered by the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO")."' Prior to TRIPs, the Berne
Convention was the dominant international intellectual property
agreement. 2 The Berne Convention was first established in 1886
and has been revised six times, most recently in 1971."' In 1989,
the United States became the last western country to join."4 The
Berne Convention establishes detailed requirements regarding
subject matter, basis of protection, preclusion of formalities (e.g.,
registration), minimum terms of protection, and exclusive rights
of the copyright authors."' Over eighty nations were Berne sig-
natories when the United States joined."
6
Entering the 1990s, the biggest weakness of WIPO was that it
lacked dispute resolution mechanisms. 1 7  This became a central
motivation for developed countries to push for an intellectual
property annex to the GATT, which would provide for a dispute
resolution mechanism."' In response to such criticism, WIPO es-
tablished the WIPO Arbitration Center in 1994; as of the end of
108 See id. at 378.
109 See id.
11 See id. at 373 n.6.
. See Berne Convention supra note 17; LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 375-76.
112 See LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 394-95.
11 See id. at 375-76.
114 The delay was caused by the Berne Convention compliance require-
ment that the United States significantly change its copyright law regarding
term, notice, and registration. See id. at 379.
"1 See generally GATT OR WIPO?: NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard
Schricker, eds., 1988) [hereinafter GATT OR WIPO?] (providing a detailed dis-
cussion of the Berne Convention provisions).
116 See LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 378.
11 See BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at 25.
118 See LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 394-95.
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1995, the Center had not been called upon to resolve a single in-
tellectual property dispute."" This reflects the reality that the
WTO and the TRIPs Agreement have almost entirely eclipsed the
influence of WIPO and the Berne Convention.
2.4.3. The Buenos Aires Convention
The United States and 17 Latin American nations are mem-
bers of the Buenos Aires Convention, which took effect in
1911.120 The central provision of the Convention is that "once
copyright is obtained for a work in one member country, protec-
tion is given by all member countries without further formali-
ties." 1
Today, virtually all Latin American countries are members of
the UCC, which provides largely the same protection with
clearer terms."z Therefore, even though Latin American publish-
ers still affix a Buenos Aires notice ("All Rights Reserved") to
their works, the Buenos Aires Convention no longer serves much
practical purpose.1"
2.5. The Regional Approach
2.5.1. The North American Free TradeAgreement
The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") was
entered into on December 17, 1993, by Canada, Mexico and the
United States. 124 NAFTA includes provisions to harmonize Ca-
nadian, Mexican, and U.S. intellectual property standards, includ-
ing the protection of computer programs as literary works. 125 In
addition, NAFTA emphasizes the effective enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights. 126 It requires signatories to make pre-trial
injunctive relief available in intellectual property cases, which
119 See BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at 25-26.
12 See Buenos Aires Convention, Aug. 20, 1910, 38 Stat. 1785, 155
L.N.T.S. 179; LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 384.
121 LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 384-85.
122 See id. at 385.
123 See id.
124 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993); Leaffer, supra note 99, at 399.
125 See LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 399.
126 See id
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"overturn[s] the reluctance of Mexican courts to grant such pre-
liminary relief.""
NAFTA goes further than TRIPs in many of its provisions,
which is understandable since only three parties are involved, as
opposed to the more than one hundred parties that negotiated
TRIPs. 28 NAFTA, as well as the USTR section 301 trade threats
that have led to bilateral agreements, are good examples of the
U.S. government effectively pushing for stronger intellectual
property protection and enforcement in Latin America." 9
2.6. The Multilateral Approach
2.6.1. TRIPs: GA TTAddresses Intellectual Property
In the 1980s, developed countries grew increasingly dissatis-
fied with international conventions such as the Berne Conven-
tion, which lacked adequate coverage of new technological ad-
vancements."' Even more importantly, the Berne Convention
had no dispute resolution mechanism to deal with member states
that neglected their treaty obligations.13'
Industry groups and governments turned to the GATT as a
means to confront intellectual property piracy.13 Between 1982
and 1986, a Preparatory Committee of the GATT identified the
issues for the upcoming GATT Round.133 The United States sug-
gested that the Round consider the issue of intellectual property
rights.1
34
Developing countries, led by Brazil and India, questioned
whether intellectual property was relevant to the GATT, given
the existence of the Berne Convention and WIPO. 13' Those de-
veloping countries preferred WIPO as the leading international
intellectual property body because WIPO is governed by an un-
weighted vote of its members (more than half of whom are devel-
127 Id.
121 See id. at 400.
129 See supra Section 2.2.
130 See LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 395.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 394.
3 See BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at 2.
34 See id. at 3.
135 See id. at 4.
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oping countries)." 6 Therefore, the United States could not exer-
cise strong influence in WIPO and could not use that venue effec-
tively to seek stronger intellectual property protection in develop-
ing nations. Understandably, developing nations would look
favorably upon the lack of U.S. influence in intellectual property
affairs because it would give traditionally poor countries more
autonomy and a greater voice in the international community.
During the GATT impasse, which developed after negotia-
tions were frustrated by a deadlock over agricultural policies, the
United States aggressively employed unilateral trade threats
against developing countries in order to advance the U.S. intellec-
tual property agenda.'37 In 1988, for example, the United States
imposed trade sanctions on Brazil for its low protection of phar-
maceutical patents. 3 ' That same year, the United States removed
tariff exemptions for Indian pharmaceutical products for the same
reason.'39 Not surprisingly, these actions led Brazil, India, and
other developing nations to agree to negotiate a new international
intellectual property agreement as part of the GATT.'
After eight years of negotiations, the Uruguay Round of the
GATT ended on December 15, 1993.'4' The TRIPs Agreement
was incorporated as an annex to the GATT. On January 1,
1995, the WTO replaced the GATT, overseeing the same trade
agreement."
TRIPs covers all aspects of intellectual property by providing
both national treatment and specific rules for minimum standards
of protection for intellectual property rights. 44 TRIPs also pro-
vides for Most Favored Nation ("MFN") treatment.4 MFN
treatment "requires that any advantage, favor, privilege or immu-
nity granted by a party to the nationals of any other country shall
136 See SHERWOOD, supra note 32, at 5.
137 See BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at 3-4, 6.
138 See id. at 6.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 395.
142 See id.
143 See id. at 395-96.
144 See id. at 396.
145 See id.
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be accorded... unconditionally to the nationals of all other
[WTO] members."146
If a member does not comply with the TRIPs provisions,
other members may invoke WTO dispute settlement proce-
dures. 4 The WTO provides for meetings between the parties to
resolve the dispute.14' If the meetings fail, a disputing party may
refer the matter to all the WTO members who, through a panel,
make recommendations to the feuding parties.149 If these proce-
dures fail, the WTO may suspend trade obligations and benefits,
such as reduced tariffs, which are normally afforded the offending
party. 150
TRIPs additionally "provides for transitional implementa-
tion: ... up to five years for developing countries, and extend-
able ten-year periods for the least developed countries.""' Be-
cause Latin American countries were deemed "developing," they
had until 2000 to bring their domestic intellectual property laws
into compliance with TRIPs.152 TRIPs explicitly requires copy-
right protection for computer programs,153 so the Latin American
signatories have agreed to implement copyright protection for
computer software by 2000. Despite the TRIPs framework, the
United States pushed for earlier compliance by way of unilateral
trade threats.
As the January 1, 2000 deadline approached, developing coun-
tries including Argentina and Columbia requested a seven-year
extension to implement TRIPs.154 Developing countries argued
that their under-financed administrations needed more time to
implement the complex agreement.1 5' The United States de-
manded that the WTO grant deadline extensions only on a case-
by-case basis.5 6 In addition, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicara-
146 Id.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id. For a detailed summary of the TRIPs provisions, see BLAKENEY,
supra note 19.
151 LEAFFER, supra note 99, at 396.
152 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13, art. 65.
153 See id. art. 10.
154 See Daniel Pruzin, Quad Group, Developing Counties Split over TRIPs
Deadline Extensions, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 4, at 143 (Jan. 27, 2000).
155 See id.
156 See id.
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gua have requested an extension."'7 The deadline extension can-
not be decided until member nations schedule new WTO talks.5 '
After a special review, on December 17, 1999, the USTR an-
nounced that Columbia would remain on its "watch list" of
countries targeted for possible Section 301 trade retaliation be-
cause of TRIPs noncompliance."5 9 Argentina and Peru remain on
the USTR Priority Watch List; Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela remain on the USTR Watch
List. 60
Additionally, in December 1999, the WTO dispute settlement
panel held that Section 301 is consistent with the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding. 161 The European Union brought the
claim in 1998, arguing that Section 301 allows unilateral retalia-
tion before a WTO Panel completes dispute arbitration; Brazil,
Columbia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador appeared as third parties.16
Before the ruling, President Clinton released a congressionally
approved statement promising not to engage in Section 301 trade
retaliation until the WTO finds a violation of U.S. trading
rights.163 In welcoming the WTO ruling, the USTR declared that
Section 301 will continue to be a "cornerstone" of U.S. efforts to
enforce its international trade policy. 1"
"' See Margalit Edelman, The Latin Lag on Intellectual Property Protection,
J. COM., Nov. 2, 1999, at 7.
158 See generally Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Says New Talks Will Not Occur Un-
til WTO Nations Rethink'Positions, 17INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 7, at 257
(Feb. 17, 2000) (describing the breakdown of Seattle WTO talks and the im-
passe in scheduling new talks).
159 See Corbett B. Daly, Colombia, Czech Republic Still on USTR List; Hong
Kong and Malaysia Elude 301 Mention, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 9
(an. 6, 2000).
"6 See USTR, USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review, supra
note 70, at 9-30.
161 USTR, WTO Panel Upholds Section 301 (last modified Dec. 22, 1999)
<http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/12/99-102.html> (USTR Press Re-
lease).
162 See id,
163 See Daniel Pruzin and Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Panel Says Section 301
Provisions Compatible with Multiateral Trade Rules, 17 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) No. 1, at 6 (Jan. 6, 2000).
16 See id.
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3. WHY SOFTWARE PIRACY IS A PROBLEM IN LATIN AMERICA
Software piracy, the illegal use and copying of software, is an
enormous problem throughout Latin America.16 This Section
discusses the motivations for piracy, the reasons that developing
nations have been slow to grant intellectual property protection
to software, and the problems of enforcing new intellectual prop-
erty laws.
3.1. Motivations for Software Piracy
Developing countries have conditions that tempt software pi-
rates. Historically, intellectual property piracy has been rampant
in poor countries because the nationals lack the resources to le-
gitimately purchase expensive technology, the governments lack
the resources and/or desire to enforce intellectual property rights,
and the low standard of living provides greater incentive for citi-
zens to engage in highly profitable piracy. More specifically, the
principal motivations for intellectual property pirates are "quick
profits, low promotional investments and risks, the ease of pro-
duction and low costs, ... unsatisfied market demand,.., the dif-
ficulty of detection and proof, and the non-deterrent effect of or
complete absence of laws."
166
Profits are high because goods such as computer software are
in extremely high demand, in large part due to the promotional
costs incurred by the rights holders.16 1 In addition, computer
software can be copied inexpensively, because the pirates do not
incur development costs, nor do they pay royalties.16 ' The pirate
need only invest in the initial copy, from which indistinguishable
copies can be produced.
169
Developing countries have an unsatisfied market demand for
goods priced too high for most consumers to afford. 7 Software
165 See generally supra Section 1 (citing software piracy figures for Latin
America).
166 BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING: GATT TRIPs
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 142 (1997).
161 See id. at 142 n.140 (citing Marianne Levin, The Meaning of Counterfeit-
ing, 18 HC 435 (1987) and Tony Swafield, Counterfeiting: The Growth Industry,
98 T.S. Rev 14 (1990)).
161 See id. at 142-43.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 143.
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is extremely costly to develop, yet inexpensive to reproduce."'
Therefore, legitimate packaged software is necessarily expensive
so that the owner of the rights may recoup development costs. A
pirated version normally sells for a tiny fraction of the cost of the
authentic version, thereby satiating the ravenous market demand
for popular software products.
Detection and proof of piracy are difficult, because rights
owners have no immediate way of knowing when the software
has been pirated." The software industry is forced to estimate
piracy rates by comparing their sales rates to estimated demand
for their product. 3 In addition, the rights owner has difficulty
proving privacy in a lawsuit unless the pirate is caught red-
handed, which is a burdensome task given the secrecy of a pirate's
operation."
Furthermore, most Latin American countries have been reluc-
tant to grant copyright protection to computer software until re-
cently."' Even where laws exist, software pirates have been unde-
terred because of lack of sanctions or enforcement." 6
Software pirates will continue to illegally copy software be-
cause of the enormous demand for, and low supply of, affordable
product. Latin American nations must protect software intellec-
tual property with legislation and enforcement, if not to line the
pockets of U.S. software companies, then for the local economic
benefits that intellectual property protection brings."'
171 See id. at 14243.
172 See id. at 145.
173 See, e.g., 1998 GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-12
(describing industry method of estimating software piracy rates).
174 See SODIPO, supra note 166, at 146.
175 See supra Section 2.3 (discussing domestic copyright laws); infra Section
3.2. (providing reasons for Latin American reluctance to increase copyright
protection).
176 See SODIPO, supra note 166, at 146; see also infra Section 3.4 (discussing
the lack of adequate laws and enforcement problems).
17" See infra Section 3.2 (discussing potential economic benefits and refut-
ing the Latin American perception that intellectual property rights benefit
only developed nations).
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3.2. The Cultural Perception That Piracy is Acceptable:
Four False Propositions Cited to Support National
Policies of Weak Protection of Intellectual Property
Four faulty justifications exist to support national policies of
weak intellectual property protection." 8 The arguments are that
weak intellectual property protection: (1) saves the country
money; (2) promotes local industry; (3) helps acquire technology;
and (4) lessens dependency on foreign nations."9 These mistaken
assumptions have historically resulted in resistance by Latin
American government and private industry to granting intellec-
tual property protection to computer software, which is manufac-
tured primarily in the United States.
3.2.1. The Cost Reduction Argument
Governments of developing countries have argued that they
benefit from weak intellectual property protection because it re-
sults in lower product prices. 8 Developing countries argue that
leaving computer software unprotected prevents foreign manufac-
turers from charging high prices on their software "monopoly,"
and allows local industry increased access to the software pro-
duced in developed nations.' 8 ' However, this theory assumes that
technological products that would be present in developing na-
tions under conditions of intellectual property protection would
also be present under non-protection conditions. 82
In fact, without protection, local industry has little incentive
to develop new intellectual property. There is less technological
competition within the country and, therefore, higher overall
prices."' In addition, foreign technology producers may not be
willing to place their products in a market that lacks intellectual
property protection.'84 These factors weaken the assumption that
local industries will have cheap access to technology should their
country not grant intellectual property protection. 8 Finally, the
178 See SHERWOOD, supra note 32, at 159.
179 See id.
180 See id. at 160.
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See id. at 160-61.
184 See id. at 161.
185 See id.
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country may suffer if technology manufacturers decide to pro-
duce their product in another country that offers intellectual
property protection.186 The non-protecting country would thus
be deprived of potential investment and revenue.
It would be unwise for developing nations to deny intellectual
property protection on the faulty assumption that to do so would
result in lower software prices. It is likely that more foreign and
domestic software companies would be willing to do business in a
nation that offered intellectual property protection. This would
increase overall business investment in the region, improve prod-
uct competition, and ultimately lower software prices.
3.2.2. The Industry Promotion Argument
Some have argued that weak intellectual property protection
promotes local industry in developing countries."' This argu-
ment suggests that local industry would flourish if it possessed the
freedom to copy foreign intellectual property, thus becoming a
"free rider." 88 The assumption is that intellectual property is
primarily owned by companies in developed countries.' 9 Nas-
cent industries in developing countries, the argument follows,
would be able to reach higher competence by copying foreign
technology for free."9  Intellectual property protection would
only be necessary after the developing countries reach a higher
stage of technological sophistication-one in which domestic
companies begin to develop original intellectual property worth
protecting.191
However, this argument ignores the opportunity cost for do-
mestic industry in developing countries. Without protection, the
incentive to conduct innovative research and development is
weak." A country is more likely to reach an international level
of achievement if there is protection available for its domestic
technological developments." In countries with legal protection,
186 See id.
187 See id. at 166.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See id. at 169.
193 See id. at 168.
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new companies are more likely to dedicate resources to new in-
novations, rather than to rely on copying.194 Therefore, the weak
intellectual property protection option exercised by some devel-
oping countries retards, rather than promotes, local industry.19
3.2.3. The Technology Acquisition Argument
The third argument often presented is that weak intellectual
property protection reduces barriers to technology acquisition.'
Again, this assumes that all worthwhile technology comes from
outside the developing country. 97 In fact, valuable technology is
being generated in countries such as Brazil and Mexico. 98 Some
Latin American firms have developed mastery in their fields, de-
spite having labored under a regime of weak intellectual property
protection.)9 With greater intellectual property incentives, Latin
American companies would significantly increase such promising
innovation.2
The technology acquisition argument also assumes that de-
sired technology will enter a country with weak protection, to be
received and used by local companies and government agencies.0 1
To the contrary, technology may not be available if the foreign
producer decides not to market its product in a country with
weak protection.0 2
Even if technology is acquired in developing countries, the
level of knowledge that may be acquired from such technology is
limited by the quantity of tacit knowledge already in the coun-
try.23 Certain technology, such as complex computer code, can-
not be understood merely by looking at the end product. If the
viewer lacks fundamental knowledge of the product's underlying
principles, nothing will be gained from the acquisition of that
technology. For example, there have been cases where poorly
made, low strength copies of pharmaceuticals have caused severe
'9' See id. at 167-68.
195 See id. at 170.
196 See id.
197 See id. at 171.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 173.
201 See id. at 172.
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medical problems among diabetics.2"4 Foreign technology is best
acquired through legitimate relationships with the foreign manu-
facturers. Legitimate relationships, in turn, foster domestic tech-
nological education. Once a country acquires a knowledge base,
the domestic research community can launch their own innova-
tions.
For these reasons, the technology acquisition argument does
not withstand scrutiny. Again, the cost of weak intellectual
property protection is outweighed by the benefits of strong pro-
tection.
3.2.4. The Lessened Dependency Argument
Some argue that weak intellectual property protection reduces
the dependency of developing countries on foreign technology
sources.20 ' The argument is that intellectual property protection
imposes foreign technology on developing countries, and that the
absence of intellectual property protection frees countries from
such dependency.0 6
This argument rests on the assumption that all technology
comes from abroad.2 7 Again, the policy of nonprotection defeats
its goal by discouraging domestic technological development.0 S
In reality, a policy of weak intellectual property protection re-
sults in the country maintaining dependency on foreign technol-
ogy rather than fostering its own research community.0 9
3.3. Public Sector Piracy
Some of the worst software pirates in developing nations have
been their own government bureaucrats. Governments that have
freely engaged in piracy are less willing to implement or enforce
intellectual property protection, thereby posing a greater chal-
lenge to U.S. intellectual property goals. Ms. Barshefsky has de-
clared, "Governments must clean up their own houses if they are
to successfully clean up copyright piracy in their private sec-
204 See id.
205 See id. at 173.
206 See id.
207 See discussion supra Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3.
208 See SHERWOOD, supra note 32, at 174.
209 See id.
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tors."21' The United States has often found that one way to en-
courage Latin American governments to "clean up their own
houses" is through the aggressive use of trade sanctions. 11
On October 1, 1998, U.S. Vice President Al Gore announced
a Presidential Executive Order, which required U.S. government
agencies to establish procedures to prevent software piracy in fed-
eral offices.212 In addition, Mr. Gore asked Ms. Barshefsky to un-
dertake a twelve-month initiative to work with other nations'
governments to prevent illegal government piracy of software.213
In addition to U.S. government efforts, the U.S. software in-
dustry battles against public sector piracy in Latin America. U.S.
software companies claim that, in Argentina, more than half of
the nation's software piracy is committed by Argentine govern-
ment institutions. 214 Although the software industry21 has
reached agreements with six Argentine provinces, police raids on
public agencies in other provinces have led to political standoffs
because the agencies have failed to meet deadlines to legally regis-
ter their software.16
In 1997, Microsoft sued the Buenos Aires Province for breach
of contract after the provincial government failed to reimburse
Microsoft for software. 17 The parties reached an out-of-court set-
tlement.2 '
Government agencies that resist using legal software likely do
not understand or believe the underlying macroeconomic benefits
of intellectual property protection. Unilateral trade threats by
the U.S. government and lawsuits by the U.S. private sector may
210 USTR, USTR Launches New Initiative to Fight Software Piracy Qast
modified Oct. 1, 1998) <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1998/10/98-88.pdt>
(USTR Press Release) [hereinafter USTR Launches New Initiative].
211 See supra Section 2.2.
212 See USTR Launches New Initiative, supra note 210.
213 See id. Of course, when the USTR "works" with other governments,
the negotiations to improve laws and enforcement often involve trade sanction
threats.
214 See Argentina: Government Blamed for Half of Losses from Software Pi-
racy, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), Oct. 28, 1997, available in
LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAPTD File [hereinafter Government Blamed].
215 The software industry refers to software manufacturers Adobe, Auto-
exec, SCO, Symantec, and Microsoft, which are all represented by the Argen-
tine organization, Software Legal. See id.
216 See Government Blamed, supra note 214.
217 See Rubenstein, Argentina Amends Law, supra note 49.
218 See id.
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force a change in the law, but probably will not produce a change
in the minds of Latin American bureaucrats who embrace soft-
ware piracy in their own offices.
3.4. Lack ofAdequate Laws or Enforcement of Existing Laws
Until recently, most Latin American countries did not grant
adequate intellectual property protection to computer software."'
For example, Brazil did not treat software as a literary work pro-
tectable by copyright for seventy years, and instead gave software
copyright protection only a short twenty-five-year term."0  In
contrast, developed nations such as the United States deem soft-
ware a literary work protected for life of the author plus seventy
years; if the software is a work made for hire, it is protected for
ninety-five years from first publication, or 120 years from crea-
tion, whichever is shorter." Furthermore, Latin American coun-
tries, including Brazil, did not have a penal law that allowed po-
lice to confiscate all contraband goods during a raid; instead,
police were limited to goods mentioned in their warrant.'
The U.S. software industry has expressed frustration with the
absence of Latin American courts and counsel competent to han-
dle technology cases, the local bias in the courts against foreign
corporate litigants, and judicial corruption.' The judiciary in
these countries often needs training in new matters of high-tech
intellectual property. 4 In addition, some Latin American judi-
cial systems lack the same adequate remedies or enforcement pro-
cedures that the U.S. judicial system employs." For example,
219 See supra Section 2.3 for a more detailed discussion of domestic laws in
Latin America regarding intellectual property protection for computer soft-
ware.
" See U.S. Groups Call on Latin America to Bolster Patent, Copyright Pro-
tection, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), Jan. 26, 1993, available
in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAPTD File.
221 17 U.S.C. 5 302 (1999).
' See U.S. Groups Call on Latin America to Bolster Patent, Copyright Pro-
tection, supra note 220.
. See Casey P. August & Michael J. Buchenhorner, Strategies for Develop-
ing Intellectual Property Portfolios in the Global Environment: Protection of Intel-
lectual Property in Hostile Environments, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.. 261, 272 (1995) (ad-
vising intellectual property owners on how to protect their intellectual
pro erty rights in devoeping nations) (The authors work for IBM's Intellec-
tualProperty Division for Latin America and Canada).
24 See Studebaker, supra note 5, at 31.
25 See August & Buchenhorner, supra note 223, at 272.
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Latin American judicial systems may have: "(1) no preliminary
or final injunctive relief; (2) lack of seizure and impoundment
remedies; (3) lack of exclusion of imports; (4) lack of compulsory
process and/or discovery; (5) inadequate civil remedies; (6) inade-
quate criminal penalties; and (7) unreasonably slow enforcement
process." ' 6 These judicial weaknesses have been an obstacle for
U.S. software companies seeking to protect their intellectual
property in Latin America.
Despite such enforcement difficulties, the U.S. software indus-
try has aggressively entered the Latin American software market
due to the enormous profit potential.'m In 1995, participants in
the software industry expressed optimism that the lack of protec-
tion for computer software would be short-lived because of the
linkage between globalization of trade and intellectual property
protection. 8 While intellectual property experts have acknowl-
edged the trade remedy available for U.S. companies under sec-
tion 301 of the Tariff and Trade Act of 1930, they have also em-
phasized that "[r]ecent trends in IP aspects of international trade
agreements are encouraging, and patience withpresent legal re-
gimes and practices should eventually pay off." This perspec-
tive recognizes that, in time, Latin American nations will comply
with TRIPs by passing laws that protect software intellectual
property and by adequately enforcing such laws.
However, not all U.S. software companies possess the pa-
tience to wait for Latin American legislatures to grant intellectual
property protection to software. The International Intellectual
Property Alliance ("IlPA"), which represents owners of software
intellectual property, has testified in front of the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks that
"without an infrastructure of strong copyright laws and enforce-
ment, 'we are quite simply helpless to stem the tide of piracy that
226 Id.
227 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 2, at 25 (describing the
U.S. packaged software industry's employment rates and revenue in Latin
America).
22 See August & Buchenhorner, supra note 223, at 273 (stating that the
lack of software intellectual property protection may be short-lived due to the
TRIPs requirement, as well as to the expected compliance of developing coun-
tries).
229 Id. at 274.
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threatens to close us out of market after market.'" 20 Despite such
alleged helplessness, the U.S. software industry has continued to
increase sales in the Latin American markets?.1
The U.S. industry has received the sympathy of the U.S.
Congress. Senator Dennis DeConcini, the chair of the panel, de-
clared that intellectual property piracy "adversely affects [the
U.S.] balance of trade, [the U.S.] GNP, and [the U.S.] standard of
living."232 He added that "'a significant portion of the U.S. trade
deficit would be erased' if the 'rampant piracy"' of U.S. intellec-
tual property in foreign markets could be stemmed. 3  With the
encouragement of the ITPA, the U.S. Congress continues gener-
ous funding to the USTR and also funds training of foreign gov-
ernment officials in enforcement? 4  The IIPA has praised the
Senate for enacting the Special 301 provision of the Trade Act, a
"'critical piece of armament necessary to win the battle,'" reflect-
ing the belief of the U.S. private and public sectors that combative
trade threats are essential to changing the intellectual property
situation in developing countries. ' As a U.S. pharmaceutical
company president declared, "To put it bluntly, [Latin American]
countries want to steal U.S. technology, then undercut us in our
own foreign markets." 6 U.S. intellectual property owners, with
full support of the U.S. government, are engaged in a hostile
struggle to force Latin American nations to implement and en-
force intellectual property protection.
230 Industry Calls for Stiffer Enforcement of Anti-Counterfeiting Laws
Abroad, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), Sept. 30, 1992, available
in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAPTD File.
231 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 2, at 25 (stating that the
expected year-on-year sales growth in the packaged software industry could
generate tax revenues of $3.9 billion to Latin American governments by the
year 2000).
232 Industry Calls for Stiffer Enforcement of Anti-Counterfeiting Laws
Abroad, supra 
note 230.
233 Id.
234 See id.
235 Id.
236 Brower A. Merriam, Intellectual Property Rights: The Relationship to
Latin American Trade and Investment, Address at the Miami Congressional
Workshop (December 5, 1987), in DIALOGUE NO. 98 (Richard Tardanico, ed.,
The Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University
1988).
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In March 1999, Microsoft pledged a two-pronged strategy to
combat software piracy in Latin AmericaY In addition to re-
maining active in trade associations that document software pi-
racy, Microsoft wants to develop local software industries." Mi-
crosoft signed an agreement with the Argentine government to
increase Argentina's software exporting capacity in exchange for
Argentina's increased effort to protect intellectual property. 9
Microsoft may have recognized that Latin American countries
are more likely to enforce intellectual property laws if the coun-
tries have local software industries to protect. Furthermore,
Latin American countries have resisted enforcing laws pushed
into existence by hostile foreign governments and corporations.
Cooperation, rather than coercion, can lead to better enforcement
of Latin American intellectual property laws.
4. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PURSUE ITS POLICIES VIA THE
WTO RATHER THAN THROUGH SECTION 301 ACTIONS
4.1. Trade Pressures Change Latin American Copyright Laws
Latin American nations rely heavily on the United States as a
trading partner. Based on 1991 figures, the United States is the
leading trade partner to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.2
For example, in 1991, 69.7% of Mexico's trade and 20.2% of Bra-
zil's trade was with the United States." If the United States had
carried out its threatened 1997 tariff increase against Argentina,
Argentine exporters would have lost between $30 million and $40
million per year.242 This would have further widened Argentina's
$2.4 billion trade deficit with the United States. Therefore, Latin
American nations would suffer great economic losses if slapped
with barriers against exporting into the United States.
"' See Kevin G. Hall, Gates: Microsoft Tackles Piracy in Latin America, J.
COM., Mar. 25, 1999, at 3A.
238 See id.
29 See id.
240 See SELL, supra note 12, at 186 (summarizing data from U.N. INT'L
TRADE STAT. Y.B., at 24, 102, 162, 170, 420, 498, 580, 866, U.N. Sales No.
E/F.93.XVII.2 1991).
241 See id.
242 See Argentine Executives, Politicians- Blast Sanctions Under Consideration
by U.S., 14 Int. Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 88 Jan. 15, 1997) [hereinafterAr-
gentine Executives].
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USTR section 301 trade sanctions have been effective in Bra-
zil. For several years in the 1980s, Brazil refused to introduce
copyright legislation protecting computer programs.24 Brazil
agreed to grant copyright protection to software only after the
United States threatened it with trade sanctions.2' The U.S. trade
threat was removed, until the U.S. government learned that the
Brazilian government had barred Microsoft from marketing its
MS-DOS product in Brazil, under the Brazilian National Infor-
matics Law designed to protect Brazilian businesses.24 Clearly,
the U.S. trade policy was designed to open up new intellectual
property markets and protect U.S. products.246
It is indisputable that the U.S. section 301 trade policy has
been instrumental in effecting recent changes in intellectual prop-
erty laws in Latin America. However, the question remains: does
unilateral coercion truly persuade a Latin American government
to enthusiastically enforce new intellectual property laws?
4.2. Similarities Between Section 301 Trade Sanctions and the
WTO Enforcement Mechanism
Similar to the Unites States' section 301, TRIPs provides for
trade-based sanctions if a member fails to protect computer soft-
ware rights. The WTO provides for consultations between the
parties to resolve an intellectual property dispute and, if neces-
sary, a referral to a WTO arbitration panel.24 If these procedures
fail to resolve the offense, the WTO may suspend trade obliga-
tions and benefits normally afforded the offending party, such as
reduced tariffs.248
The similarities in enforcement procedures of section 301 and
WTO/TRIPs are not surprising, given that both reflect U.S. trade
based approaches to intellectual property. The United States sug-
243 See Thomas Dreier, National Treatment, Reciprocity and Retorsion- The
Case of Computer Programs and Integrated Circuits, in GATT OR WIPO?, supra
note 115, at 63, 68-69.
244 See id. at 69.
245 See id.
246 See id.
247 See WTO, The WTO's "Most Individual Contribution,' (last modified
Feb. 6, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/about/disputel.htm> (describing
WTO dispute settlement procedures).
248 See id. For a detailed summary of the TRIPs provisions, see BLAKENEY,
supra note 19.
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gested introducing intellectual property issues into the GATT ne-
gotiations only after the United States had enjoyed unprecedented
intellectual property policy influence by using section 301
threats.249 Developing nations such as Brazil protested linking in-
tellectual property and trade, because they realized they would be
at a serious disadvantage in trade disputes.2"' The United States
found the GATT/WTO venue much more attractive than WIPO
precisely because developed nations, with their immense value to
developing nations as trading partners, have extensive leverage in
a system that permits trade sanctions.
The United States is required under TRIPs to submit intellec-
tual property complaints to the Dispute Settlement Body of the
WTO and abide by the WTO ruling." 1 However, the United
States indicated that it will continue to engage in an aggressive
section 301 policy because it can pressure developing nations to
enact even greater intellectual property protection than required
by TRIPs.'
When the United States opts for swift section 301 results over
slower WTO dispute settlement procedures and lower TRIPs
protection requirements, the United States is not laying the foun-
dation for true cultural acceptance of intellectual property rights.
Rather, U.S. trade aggression increases the Latin American per-
ception that the true beneficiaries of intellectual property rights
are U.S. capitalists.
4.3. Benefits of WTO Dispute Settlement over Section 301
4.3.1. Maintaining Good Diplomatic Relations with
WTO Members
Once the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding becomes
fully effective this year, the extent to which unilateral action can
be taken to remedy a trade practice may become a contentious is-
249 See Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property
Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y
465, 473 (1994).
50 See id. at 473-74.
21 See SELL, supra note 12, at 222-23.
252 See id.
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sue for the United States.253 It is an open question whether the
United States, as a WTO member, may legally engage in such uni-
lateral trade aggression. However, there is no doubt that the in-
ternational community will vigorously protest such U.S. actions.
Indeed, during the December 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle
that launched a new round of talks, developing countries ex-
pressed resentment at the long list of inflexible U.S. demands.254
Ultimately, the Seattle meeting ended without agreement on a fu-
ture negotiations agenda.
The United States can lessen such diplomatic tension by ceas-
ing their section 301 trade aggression, and relying primarily on
the WTO Dispute Mechanism agreed to by over 100 GATT sig-
natory nations.
4.3.2. Respecting the Autonomy ofLatin American Nations to
Determine Their Own Laws
The United States should respect the autonomy of Latin
American nations to determine their own intellectual property
laws. A nation's laws and policies are more effective when
reached after independent national debate and deliberation. If a
developing nation reaches, independently, the valid conclusion
that it would benefit in the long term from intellectual property
protection, then that nation would be eager to enact and enforce
intellectual property laws. Instead, the United States has prodded
and infuriated Latin American policymakers with unilateral trade
threats.
For example, in January 1997, Argentine Foreign Relations
Minister Guido di Tella protested against a U.S. threat of possible
trade sanctions regarding Argentine intellectual property laws,
stating, "We have a patent law which... was decided upon by
Argentinians [sic] and it is perfectly compatible with norms con-
tained in the GATT. Nobody can attempt trade reprisals against
us for this law because we would denounce any such attempt be-
fore the World Trade Organization."255 The president of the
Chamber of Argentine Exporters stated that "[t]here is nothing
" See id. at 223 (citing Dorothy Shrader, Intellectual Property Provisions of
the GA 771994: The TRIPs Agreement, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep., Rep. No. 94-302
A, Mar. 16, 1994, at 13).
254 See Trade In Parenthesis, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1999.
255 Argentine Executives, supra note 242, at 88.
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wrong with the [intellectual property] law, but the U.S. is look-
ing for GATT-plus. As a general policy, the U.S. is targeting...
[intellectual property rights] worldwide, and it is looking for
someone to make an example of." 6 Thus, both the Argentine
public and private sectors expressed resentment against U.S. inter-
ference in their legislative decisions.
One can assume that Latin American nations would prefer to
negotiate trade disputes under the auspices of the WTO rather
than suffer unilateral trade pressure from the United States. De-
veloping nations are already disadvantaged in trade disputes be-
cause of their reliance on richer trade partners. In the WTO,
however, they would have the option of arbitration by an inter-
national panel. In addition, the Latin American nations agreed
autonomously to comply with TRIPs by the year 2000.217 How-
ever, before the ink dried on their signatures, the United States
demanded something very different: stronger Latin American in-
tellectual property protection before 2000.
4.4. Trade Sanctions Have Changed Laws, not Minds
Only after extreme trade pressures from the United States
have Latin American countries granted intellectual property pro-
tection to computer software." 8 Had they believed in the need
for such laws, they would have reached that conclusion without
external pressure. Instead, their membership in the WTO re-
quired Latin American countries to gradually implement software
protection.
In 1996, a Costa Rican Supreme Court Judge stated, "We
must devise educational programs to teach the public to respect
intellectual property laws in the same way we have taught it to
understand and respect our tax laws.... The more people under-
stand the need for intellectual property protection, the more crea-
tivity will flourish unencumbered by piracy.... ,,5 9 Realizing the
256 Id.
257 A counterargument is that developing nations had to agree to TRIPs in
order to receive the bundle of GATT trade benefits, but that they had little de-
sire to improve their intellectual property protection. Indeed, the strong resis-
tance of developing countries to add intellectual property issues to the GATT
indicates they did not favor a non-WIPO system that could punish their non-
compliance with intellectual property protection.
258 See supra Section 2.2.
" Meeting Looks at Intellectual Property Protection in Western Hemisphere,
Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), Aug. 19, 1996, available in
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benefits of education, U.S. software companies have worked to
increase awareness in both the public and private sectors about
the benefits of intellectual property protection to a domestic
economy.
260
Latin American nations have historically resisted granting
strong intellectual property protection because they view it as
primarily beneficial to foreign countries. Latin American nations
will best enforce intellectual property protection when they real-
ize its potential for domestic economic improvement. It remains
to be seen whether Latin American countries will enforce new in-
tellectual property laws passed only after hostile U.S. trade
threats. Laws that were initiated and passed by Latin American
countries would have resulted in the most effective intellectual
property protection, but the United States did not wait for Latin
American nations to pass new laws in willful compliance with
TRIPs. Waiting for these countries to come to their own realiza-
tions about the benefits of intellectual property protection may
have resulted in better enforcement, and a better situation in the
long run for U.S. companies as well.
The USTR's January 2000 request for a WTO hearing regard-
ing Argentina's weak pharmaceutical protection laws indicates
that the USTR would indeed use the WTO dispute mechanism to
battle piracy of software copyrights.261  As of January 2000, the
USTR was conducting a special review of developing countries to
evaluate their TRIPs compliance.262 The USTR stated it would
work "in conjunction" with multilateral organizations such as the
WTO to assist developing nations in meeting their TRIPs obliga-
tions." However, the USTR continues to apply unilateral trade
pressure, keeping Argentina and Peru on the USTR "priority
watch list" which may lead to U.S. trade sanctions." Therefore,
although the United States is using the WTO framework to
LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAPTD File [hereinafter Meeting Looks at Intellectual
Property].
260 See Autodesk, White Paper: Why Autodesk Cares About Software Pi-
racy... And Why You Shou7d, Too (visited Jan. 22, 1999) <http://
www.autodesk.com/products/whtpaper/piracy/whycare.htm >.
261 See USTR Announces Result of Special 301 Annual Review, supra note 70,
at 4.
262 See id. at 3.
263 See id.
264 See id. at 2.
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achieve intellectual property protection in Latin America, the
United States has not abandoned its aggressive unilateral trade
policy.
5. CoNCLUSION
The United States should halt its carrot-and-stick trade ap-
proach to intellectual property foreign policy. Although Latin
American nations have reluctantly changed their copyright laws
to grant protection to computer software, they have not changed
the underlying mindset that resists change. In the future, the
United States should resolve its intellectual property disputes in
the WTO forum, a mechanism in existence largely because of
U.S. influence. In addition, the United States should have the pa-
tience to allow Latin American countries to implement a genuine,
self-determined enforcement of their new intellectual property
laws.
A mindset shift will inevitably occur, because although intel-
lectual property protection certainly assists U.S. software compa-
nies in their quest for profits, it also improves the economies of
developing nations.265 For this reason, Latin American nations
have slowly come to realize the importance of granting intellec-
tual property protection to computer software. In time, the deep-
seeded assumptions that have deterred intellectual property pro-
tection and enforcement will dissolve as Latin American countries
enjoy the economic advantages of newly granted protection.
However, there is a risk that the Latin American governments
will resist enforcing the nascent software intellectual property
laws that were born of overzealous U.S. demands. Latin Ameri-
can countries have been enraged by perceived U.S. capitalist bul-
lies, and may ignore the real benefits that enforced intellectual
property protection can bring their people. Therefore, the U.S.
government must be sensitive to the delicacy of the situation. In
the long term, developing countries will better protect software if
they have time to realize the predicted economic benefits of intel-
lectual property protection. With a less aggressive trade policy,
the U.S. software industry may not increase their profits as dra-
matically in the short term; however, the industry would surely
265 See supra Section 3.2 (analyzing the faulty assumptions of countries that
have historically not granted intellectual property protection to technology).
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enjoy long-term success in a market culture that has learned to
value intellectual property protection.
WIPO has suggested that investment and the predictability of
security of sound legal protection are key to the growth of intel-
lectual property development in Latin America.2 66 "[T]o change
the global economic dialogue from one of struggle to one of co-
operation.., countries must focus ... on cultivating a capacity to
generate the financing that is critical to the development of new
ideas ... ,26 The United States could provide foreign aid ear-
marked for Latin American research and development. Although
such an investment would result in potential competition for U.S.
companies, it would also increase Latin American self-interest in
enforcing effective intellectual property protection.
The shortcomings of the USTR's actions have been described
in unflattering terms:
Her policy, like that of many of her predecessors, is based
on a narrow, legalistic view of the world. It is about
screwing concessions from other countries, rather than
about the mutual benefits of free trade. It is about enforc-
ing the letter of [trade] agreements, at the expense of the
bigger picture.6 8
Here, the "bigger picture" is how to foster an environment of
effective intellectual property protection in Latin American mar-
kets for the mutual trade benefit of the United States and the
Latin American nations. Such an accomplishment would enor-
mously strengthen the Latin American nations economically, and
would create a perpetually growing market for U.S. trade. The
key is cooperation and education, rather than coercion.
266 See Meeting Looks at Intellectual Property, supra note 259.
267 Id.
261 Objection, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 1999, at 61.
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